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Unconscious letter discrimination is enhanced by association
with conscious color perception in visual form agnosia
Salvatore Aglioti*, Emanuela Bricolo†, Anna Cantagallo‡ and Giovanni Berlucchi§
Adaptive behavior guided by unconscious visual cues
occurs in patients with various kinds of brain damage
as well as in normal observers, all of whom can process
visual information of which they are fully unaware [1–8].
Little is known on the possibility that unconscious
vision is influenced by visual cues that have access to
consciousness [9]. Here we report a ‘blind’ letter
discrimination induced through a semantic interaction
with conscious color processing in a patient who is
agnosic for visual shapes, but has normal color vision
and visual imagery. In seeing the initial letters of color
names printed in different colors, it is normally easier to
name the print color when it is congruent with the initial
letter of the color name than when it is not [10]. The
patient could discriminate the initial letters of the
words ‘red’ and ‘green’ printed in the corresponding
colors significantly above chance but without any
conscious accompaniment, whereas he performed at
chance with the reverse color–letter mapping as well as
in standard tests of letter reading. We suggest that the
consciously perceived colors activated a representation
of the corresponding word names and their component
letters, which in turn brought out a partially successful,
unconscious processing of visual inputs corresponding
to the activated letter representations. 
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Results and discussion
Patient SF, a 40-year-old Italian man, suffered a pro-
longed cardio-respiratory arrest in the course of an endo-
scopic extraction of a foreign body from the trachea. As a
consequence, he developed a bilateral posterior brain
atrophy, particularly marked in the parieto-occipital
regions (Figure 1), and a dense apperceptive visual
agnosia, a disruption of visual perception with partial
preservation of basic sensory visual functions [11]. His
post-accident verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) of 96 sug-
gested that intelligence was largely preserved. Apart
from a slight slurring of speech, language and praxic
functions were intact. Standard neurological examina-
tions revealed no deficits in basic somatosensory func-
tions (tactile, proprioceptive, and thermic sensitivity) or
motor functions (muscle strength and force). The patient
could easily recognize objects by using touch or audition
and could detect the presence or absence of light, though
in a computerized perimetry test he responded solely to
high-intensity flashes in the visual field periphery,
30 degrees or more from the fovea, and not to more
central or lower-intensity flashes (data not shown). He
could also recognize the direction of visual motion and
judge the distance of visual targets based on binocular
and monocular stereoperception. 
SF could name color stimuli without difficulty, even when
presented with an array of up to six color patches, though
he exhibited a moderate degree of inaccuracy when asked
to point at a given target color in the array of six, possibly
because of a mild optic limb ataxia, unaccompanied by
oculomotor apraxia. The most conspicuous deficit was that
he could not identify or discriminate even simple visual
shapes and objects, a disability of which he was fully
aware. Visual imagery, as assessed by tests previously used
in cortically blind patients [12], appeared intact. It is rele-
vant for the purposes of this study that he performed per-
fectly in sub-tests requiring him to imagine visual features
of target letters, such as presence or absence of curved or
straight strokes and top/bottom size differences, and to
describe differences and similarities between two imag-
ined letters. He succeeded in correctly writing single
letters to dictation, but when, minutes later, he was shown
the letters he had written, he could not recognize them.
He consistently failed standard clinical tests of reading
and visual form recognition, to the point that he could not
recognize single black letters presented against a white
background. The patient’s near-normal performance in
color and motion visual tests was consistently reported by
him to match a distinct subjective awareness of the
stimuli. Thus, it cannot be regarded as a manifestation of
blindsight, the ability of patients with primary visual
cortex lesions to react to visual information from the areas
of their visual field that they cannot see (their scotomata),
in spite of their bona fide denial of being aware of that
information [1], or similar forms of unconscious residual
vision following other kinds of brain damage [6]. 
We used a modified version of the Stroop test [13] to
assess whether chromatic stimuli, which SF could see con-
sciously, could disclose some latent capacity for processing
visual shapes by means of a top-down control involving
the semantic level. In the standard version of the Stroop
test, normally seeing subjects are comparatively fast in
naming the color in which a word is written if the word
matches the name of the color, and comparatively slow if
the word denotes a competing color. The Stroop effect is
best accounted for by a parallel distributed processing
model in which the two pathways, one for color informa-
tion and the other for word information, are made up of
units that converge onto a shared response mechanism.
Learning and attention modulate the strength of intercon-
nections among units to produce the final response
according to the demands of the task [13]. As it has been
reported that this effect can be obtained just as well with
single-letter stimuli corresponding to the initials of color
names [10] as with whole words, we have adapted this
simplified paradigm to the testing of SF. 
SF was examined in repeated tests for color discrimination
and letter discrimination one year after the accident. In
both discriminations, there were four stimuli: a red capital
R, a green capital V, a red capital V and a green capital R.
R and V are the initials of the Italian words ‘rosso’ for ‘red’
and ‘verde’ for ‘green’. The R letters were 5.2 cm high
and 3.5 cm wide; the V letters were 5.5 cm high and their
width was 4 cm at the top and 0.6 cm at the bottom. The
letters were generated on the screen of a computer, the
average luminance being 15 cd/m2 for red letters and
46 cd/m2 for green letters; background luminance was
0.1 cd/m2. The subject, positioned at a distance of 40 cm
from the screen, was instructed to fixate the center of the
screen at the beginning of each trial but was allowed to
move head and eyes when the stimulus was present. The
stimulus remained on until the subject’s response. The
sequence of stimulus presentation was controlled by the
MEL2 software package [14], which also recorded
response accuracy and speed. There were three sessions of
40 trials each for both the color discrimination and the
letter discrimination; the order of presentation of the two
types of discrimination was counterbalanced across ses-
sions. The succession of stimuli was random, with the con-
straint that in each session there were 20 congruent
stimuli (10 red Rs and 10 green Vs) and 20 incongruent
stimuli (10 green Rs and 10 red Vs). In the letter discrimi-
nation task, the subject was instructed to press a key with
the right thumb as fast as possible in response to the letter
R, regardless of its color, and another key with the right
little finger in response to the letter V, again regardless of
its color. In the color discrimination task, the subject was
asked to press with the right thumb in response to the red
color and with the right little finger in response to the
green color, both regardless of whether it was carried by an
R or a V. A forced-response paradigm was used through-
out, and no feedback about accuracy and speed of perfor-
mance was provided. 
A control experiment run with the same stimuli and proce-
dure on eight normal observers (age range 31–46 years)
showed no differences in accuracy between tasks. In the
color task, there was a trend towards a higher accuracy for
congruent stimuli (98.2% correct) than incongruent
stimuli (96.1% correct; t(7) = 2.24, p = 0.06), but no such
trend was observed in the letter task (congruent stimuli
97.1% correct, incongruent stimuli 96.8% correct, t(7) < 1,
not significant). Moreover, in typical Stroop-effect fashion,
the color task yielded response times (RTs) that were sig-
nificantly longer for incongruent stimuli (mean RT
415.3 msec) than congruent stimuli (mean RT 393.5 msec,
t(7) = 2.51, p < 0.05), whereas no such difference occurred
in the letter task (RT for congruent stimuli 424.3 msec,
RT for incongruent stimuli 429.2 msec; t(7) < 1, not signif-
icant). These results confirm Regan’s report [10] of a
Stroop-like effect based on the initials of color names, and
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Figure 1
Selected transverse magnetic resonance
imaging (T2-weighted) sections showing the
posterior brain atrophy of patient SF (arrows),
which is most marked in the occipital and
parietal lobes. The magnetic resonance
imaging examination was performed
six months after the accident. The front of the
head is uppermost and the right side of the
brain (R) is on the left of each image.
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extend her verbal-response findings to a manual-response
paradigm. The task-irrelevant stimulus letters can be
assumed to induce an automatic activation of the repre-
sentations of the corresponding color names, with the
result that responses to colors congruent with such names
are expedited and responses to colors incongruent with
such names are retarded.
When performing the two tasks, SF made it clear that he
could consciously perceive the colors but not the letters,
and that he felt that his forced responses to the latter
stimuli were the result of mere guessing. In the color task,
his accuracy was 95.8% correct with congruent stimuli and
97.5% correct with incongruent stimuli (χ2 < 1, not signifi-
cant), and his RTs to the two kinds of stimuli were statisti-
cally indistinguishable (RT to congruent stimuli 1.5 sec,
RT to incongruent stimuli 1.4 sec; unpaired t-test,
t(230) < 1, not significant). In the letter discrimination
task, SF performed at chance with the incongruent stimuli
(50.8% correct responses), but his accuracy rose signifi-
cantly above chance when he responded to congruent
stimuli (72.5% correct responses, χ2 = 11.82, p < 0.001).
The accuracy advantage for congruent over incongruent
stimuli was 23.4% with the letter R and 20% with the
letter V. The overall RT of correct responses was signifi-
cantly longer for incongruent stimuli (mean 8.6 sec) than
for congruent stimuli (mean 6.8 sec; unpaired t-test,
t(146) = 2.9, p = 0.004). The RT advantage for congruent
over incongruent stimuli was 0.9 seconds for the letter R
and 2.7 seconds for the letter V. The patient’s RT perfor-
mance in the letter task is shown in Figure 2. RTs for
incorrect responses were not different for congruent and
incongruent pairings (10.4 sec vs 9.2 sec; unpaired t-test,
t(90) < 1, not significant). 
Although SF’s performance showed changes over the
three sessions of the letter task, the influence of color on
letter discrimination was evident in all sessions: accuracy
was better and RT was shorter with congruent stimuli
than with incongruent stimuli. In the last session, SF
volunteered that he had a feeling of responding above
chance, though he still had no conscious awareness of the
letter presented on any given trial. Because of this con-
stant denial of a conscious perception of the letter stimuli,
SF’s better-than-chance ability to discriminate such
stimuli, along with his greater speed of response to color-
congruent than color-incongruent letters, qualifies as a
form of residual unconscious vision related to blindsight
[1] and other similar visual performances reported in
patients with cortical blindness from diffuse cortical
lesions (for example [2]), visual hemineglect and extinc-
tion (for example [3]), hemispherectomy (for example [4])
and various types of visual agnosias (for example [5,6]),
and even in normal subjects performing some tasks that
involve the processing of visual stimuli presented for
extremely brief periods (for example [7,8]).
In the color discrimination task, SF’s high-level perfor-
mance was consistent with his preserved ability to see
colors consciously, and his failure to show a standard
Stroop effect was consistent with his general inability to
recognize letter stimuli in many previous clinical and
experimental tests. Unlike normal observers, who in color
discrimination tasks cannot suppress a fast automatic pro-
cessing of the task-irrelevant alphabetic material (standard
Stroop effect), any potential engagement of a residual
unconscious processing of the letter stimuli in SF would
be pre-empted by his rapid conscious processing of the
color stimuli. In the letter discrimination task, however,
SF’s performance suggested the occurrence of an uncon-
scious processing of letter stimuli that was shown by his
more accurate and faster handling of color-congruent than
color-incongruent letters. This finding can be accounted
for as follows. Because of SF’s preserved visual imagery,
perceived colors would activate an orthographic represen-
tation of the corresponding word name, which in turn,
according to McClelland and Rumelhart’s computational
model of interactive letter and word perception [15],
would activate the orthographic representation of the
word’s component letters. This top-down influence, con-
cerning in this case the word’s initial letter, would act on
any existing ability for visual processing of letters by
giving an advantage to inputs consistent with the activated
letter representation over inputs inconsistent with it. We
propose that, in the case of an input consistent with the
activated letter representation, the advantage afforded to
that input was sufficient to reveal a partial residual ability
of SF to unconsciously process letters. When SF’s residual
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Figure 2
Patient SF’s response times (RTs; mean and standard errors) to the
two letter stimuli in the letter discrimination task. RT is shown as a
function of the congruency and incongruency between each letter and
each print color.
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ability for letter processing lacked a top-down support
because of the inconsistency between the input and the
activated letter representation, this ability appeared inade-
quate to produce an above-chance performance, despite
his very long response time. 
It seems important to point out that, in the letter discrimi-
nation task, SF’s RT to both color-congruent and color-
incongruent letters was much longer than his RT in the
color discrimination task, suggesting that the proposed
activation of the color name and its initial letter followed,
and depended on, SF’s conscious perception of the color.
In blindsight patients, visual performance can in some
cases be improved by learning and practice under volun-
tary control, but the mechanisms of these effects are still
largely mysterious [16,17]. Only recently has some evi-
dence been obtained for a presumably attentional or
arousing modulation of blindsight by temporal cues that
had access to consciousness [9]. 
If SF’s above-chance performance in the discrimination of
color-congruent letters qualifies as a form of unconscious
vision related to blindsight, it follows from our results that
just as blindsight can modulate conscious vision (for
example [18,19]), so conscious vision can modulate resid-
ual unconscious vision. A similar conclusion can be drawn
from Marcel’s recent report that two subjects with unilat-
eral visual cortex lesions could fuse complementary inputs
from the normal field and the ‘blind’ field into a single
percept [20]. We should stress that, because SF’s exploita-
tion of color to aid letter discrimination probably
depended on a color-derived semantic-orthographic repre-
sentation, the facilitation of his performance was very dif-
ferent from reported facilitations of object or shape
recognition that rely on the direct generation of shape
from color [21] or wavelength [22]. Our findings with SF
also differ from the standard Stroop effect found in a glob-
ally aphasic patient who was unable to understand the
meaning of written color names but showed the typical
influence of such names on his response speed in a color
naming task [23]. This suggests that, unlike SF, whose
processing of written verbal material is extremely poor, in
the above-mentioned aphasic patient the visual processing
of words was sufficiently spared to secure access to a
semantic level that allowed interaction with color names,
even though this was completely outside of consciousness.
In this connection, we assume that, quite independent of
chromatic stimulation, any input or procedure that is ade-
quate to arouse the representation of a color name would
allow SF’s implicit visual processing of letters consistent
with that representation. This assumption can be experi-
mentally tested.
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